This paper focuses on two of the points raised in Sharrock and Coulter
's (1998) critique of James Gibson's later theorizing. They argue that
Gibson limited himself to an overly abstracted and unified notion of
'perception', and that his theory of affordances involved an overly re
strictive claim about the 'objects' of perception. We suggest an alter
native reading of the theory of affordances, namely as a challenge to
the traditional theoretical schema of 'perception'. Gibson's last book
, we argue, is primarily about agency, about how we can act. We accept
Sharrock and Coulter's point that ecological psychology needs to find
a place for 'concepts' in its account of human life, but we question
their apparent a priori assumption that human 'perceptual activities'
are entirely 'rule-governed'. The degree and manner in which concepts
figure in human life is indeed a matter for investigation.