POLITICAL REGIMES AND THE EXTRACTIVE CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENTS - TAXATION IN DEMOCRACIES AND DICTATORSHIPS

Recent political and economic transformations in Latin America, Africa , Asia, and Eastern Europe have brought about a renewed interest in th e incentives and capabilities of different types of political regimes to implement policies that are deemed necessary for economic developme nt, in particular, policies aimed at increasing tax revenue. One centr al question is whether democracies can collect as much in taxes as dic tatorships. This article addresses this question by examining whether regime type, classified as democracy or dictatorship, has a causal imp act on a government's capacity to mobilize resources through taxation. On the basis of data gathered for 108 countries for the period betwee n 1970 and 1990, the article concludes that observed differences acros s countries regarding the level of taxes collected by the government a re not due to the fact that some are under a democracy and others unde r a dictatorship. Concerns about the inability of democratic regimes t o collect taxes are, therefore, unfounded.