MOBILIZATION, SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND TURNOUT - EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN

The strategic elites model of turnout argues that elites mobilize more when the probability of their effort deciding the electoral outcome i s greater. Although the literature assumes that this probability depen ds solely on how close the election is, logically it depends jointly o n how many votes are needed to affect the outcome (closeness) and on h ow many additional votes elite efforts are likely to garner (vote yiel d). Because the vote yield of mobilizational effort varies with the so cial capital of the district that elites face, the level of elite mobi lizational effort (hence turnout) should depend interactively on close ness and social capital. The authors test their predictions using data from Japanese lower house elections for the years 1967-90. Japan is a n interesting test case both because its (former) electoral system dif fers from that for which the model was first developed and because the literature clearly stresses the role of elite mobilization through so cial networks but does not examine the particular hypotheses advanced here.