PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF SCIENCE - BEYOND THE KUHNIAN PARADIGM

At issue in this paper is the question of the appropriate relationship between the philosophy and history of science. The discussion starts with a brief sketch of Kuhn's approach, followed by an analysis of the so-called 'testing-theories-of-scientific-change programme'. This pro gramme is an attempt at a more rigorous approach to the historical phi losophy of science. Since my conclusion is that, by and large, this at tempt has failed, I proceed to examine some more promising approaches. First, I deal with Hacking's recent views on the issues in question, particularly his notion of a 'style of reasoning'. Next, Nickles's rec onstructionist interpretation of the development of science and his vi ews on Whig history are addressed. Finally, I propose an account of ph ilosophy as a theoretical, an interpretative and explanatory, enterpri se. Thus, three alternatives to the Kuhnian paradigm are discussed, al ternatives that share a recognition of the relative autonomy of philos ophy from history. Hence, they assume a less tight relationship betwee n philosophy and history of science than is the case within the Kuhnia n paradigm. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.