Why do democracies win the wars they fight? The authors explore this q
uestion by examining whether the armies of democratic states fight wit
h higher military effectiveness on the battlefield, testing two genera
l propositions: that the higher legitimacy of democratic states spurs
superior individual soldiering and that democratic militaries are like
ly to have higher organizational efficacy. The authors test their prop
ositions on a comprehensive set of major battles from 1800 to 1982, us
ing data compiled by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organizati
on. The authors find that the armies of democratic states tend to figh
t with marginally better logistics, substantially better initiative, a
nd superior leadership. They also find that all three of these advanta
ges dwindle as wars lengthen and interpret the results as indicating t
hat although soldiers are not more willing to die for democratic gover
nments, the emphasis on individual initiative in democratic culture ge
nerates important advantages on the battlefield.