The author models warfare as a random-walk stochastic process. Rather
than model war as a single-shot lottery, as is common in the literatur
e, nations fight a series of battles. Nations do not defeat their foe
in a single battle; rather, victory results from aggregate success ove
r a series of interactions. Only by gradually reducing an opponent's c
apacity to resist can a nation force victory. Yet, under many circumst
ances, nations preempt defect by surrendering once the tide of war mov
es against them. The author characterizes the distribution of resource
s that results in conflict. Against this background the author examine
s how the preferences of leaders affect the conditions under which war
occurs. Because the preferences of leaders affect the pattern of conf
lict, citizens' electoral choices are made contingent on the internati
onal environment. Hence. the author provides a link between conflict b
ehavior and domestic electoral processes.