NEGOTIATING THE TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - WAR AIMS AND BARGAINING LEVERAGE

How do we explain the wide variation in the terms of settlement that e nd wars? One possibility is that the terms of settlement merely reflec t the belligerents' original aims. A second possibility is that the fi nal terms arise out of negotiations to terminate the war and reflect e ach side's evaluation of the costs and political risks of continuing t he war. The author tests hypotheses derived from both perspectives usi ng ordered logit regression in the period 1816-1980. The results gener ally support both the aims and the bargaining hypotheses. In contrast, the author finds that the belligerents regime type does not affect th e final terms. The author concludes that belligerents generally use th e bargaining leverage they have to demand as much as possible and to c oncede as little as possible, but their original aims can affect their bargaining leverage by increasing the political risks of continuing t he war past a certain point.