THE DECLINING ADVANTAGES OF DEMOCRACY - A COMBINED MODEL OF WAR OUTCOMES AND DURATION

The authors estimate a dynamic model to assess the effects of democrac y on war outcomes and how these effects vary over time. Using quantita tive data drawn from interstate wars between 1816 and 1990, the author s demonstrate that the wartime advantages that accrue to democratic st ates are fleeting. In the short run, democracies are more likely to wi n than are their autocratic opponents. However, although they are at a n apparent disadvantage in short wars, autocracies are far less likely to quit as time passes. This willingness to continue fighting ultimat ely leads to the result that after roughly 18 months have passed, the advantage passes to the autocrat. Democracies at that point become far more likely than autocratic states to quit and more willing to settle for draws or losses. The authors also find that relationships between war outcomes and a number of control variables such as military-indus trial capacity and military strategy vary over time.