Tw. Hall, THE SOUL OR SUBSTANTIVE SELF AS EXPERIENCER, ACTUALIZER, AND REPRESENTATIVE IN PSYCHOANALYTIC-THEORY, Journal of psychology and theology, 26(1), 1998, pp. 55-65
Numerous prominent psychoanalytic theories of the self are reviewed an
d several problems with these conceptualizations are discussed. The es
sential problem highlighted is that various psychoanalytic theorists h
ave identified self with three different conceptual categories: (a) se
lf-representations, (b) subjective experiences, and (c) capacities. Th
ese categories have not yet been integrated in any meaningful way leav
ing psychoanalytic theorists devoid of a coherent theory of the self a
nd any notion of agency. In light of these problems, an attempt is mad
e to synthesize a broad range of psychoanalytic theories of the self.
It is proposed that the term self should be reserved for the embodied
nonphysical aspect of a person to prevent terminological confusion wit
h the idea of self as an intrapsychic agency. Furthermore, it is propo
sed that the notion of the self as a substance accounts for all three
conceptual categories in that the three things of which a substance is
a unity (parts, properties, and capacities) correspond precisely with
the three conceptual categories with which psychoanalytic theorists h
ave tended to identify self. The substantive self is viewed as the thi
ng that possesses and unites its subjective experiences, self-represen
tations, and capacities. In other words, the self is the experiencer,
actualizer, and representative. The view of self as substance has impl
ications for therapy in that it places a focus on continuity and agenc
y.