SOCIAL CHOICE IN A PLURALITARIAN DEMOCRACY - THE POLITICS OF MARKET LIBERALIZATION IN NEW-ZEALAND

Applying insights from social-choice theory to illuminate the function ing of pluralitarian Westminster institutions, this article develops a coherent political answer to four puzzling questions about the econom ic liberalization that transformed New Zealand in 1984-93: why an anti -statist programme was initiated (and largely accomplished) by a labou r party, why restructuring was more radical in New Zealand than in oth er democracies, why reformers were able to prevail through two electio ns and a change of government, and why they committed costly policy-se quencing errors. Understanding this remarkable case has implications f or empirically grounded social-choice theory, the political theory of policy reform, and the evaluation of pluralitarian democracy - which N ew Zealanders themselves repudiated in 1993 by adopting proportional r epresentation.