MIND, MEMORY AND HISTORY - HOW CLASSIFICATIONS ARE SHAPED BY AND THROUGH TIME, AND SOME CONSEQUENCES

Understanding the history of systematics bears on contemporary issues such as the distinction between classifications and systems, the belie f that 'natural' classifications reflect the progressive refinement of our ideas of relationships, and the dubious reputation acquired by sy stematics. Here I emphasize the extent to which 'mind' shapes classifi cations. I show that groups in biological classifications often have s ix or fewer members, in line with the number of things that humans can conveniently memorize together. Concerns about memorization are evide nt in the work of systematists like Tournefort, Linnaeus, and Antoine- Laurent de Jussieu, and the whole hierarchy of George Bentham's and J. D. Hooker's great Genera plantarum is structured by such concerns. An analytical element in Jussieu's work was emphasized by Cuvier and oth ers, and the hierarchy of their classifications reflects more directly aspects of nature as they understood it, although concerns about memo risation remain evident. Linking an understanding of what classificati ons can represent to the ideas the makers of classifications had about nature makes it clear that classifications are rarely rigid class hie rarchies, but are often more like systems. Historically, the synthetic approach, discussed here, tends to lead to systems, the analytical ap proach, to 'classifications'. We must remember that systematists' work is evaluated by other scientists, and by society at large. The confus ion evident in systematics simply confirmed the negative perceptions t hat many people in the nineteenth century had of naturalists, botanist s and zoologists, perceptions that persist today. Zoologica Scripta it self, and the Journal of Natural History, which under this title is ab out the same age, reflect part of this history. I conclude by emphasiz ing (1) if systems or classifications in the nineteenth century reflec t 'nature', it is a nature very different from that we understand toda y, and (2) the extent and the persistence of the opposition between th e synthetic and anaytical approaches. (C) 1998 The Norwegian Academy o f Science and Letters.