THE MC-VALUE FOR MONOTONIC NTU-GAMES

The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which are extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hy perplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-v alue coincides with the Shapley value for TU-games and with the consis tent Shapley value for hyperplane games. It is shown that on the class of bargaining games the MC-value coincides with the Raiffa-Kalai-Smor odinsky solution. Furthermore, two characterizations of the MC-value a re provided on subclasses of NTU-games which need not be convex valued . This allows for a comparison between the MC-value and the egalitaria n solution introduced by Kalai and Samet (1985).