This paper analyzes the savings and longevity impacts of mortality-con
tingent claims, defined here as income measures, such as annuities and
life insurance, under which earned income is contingent on the length
of one's life. The postwar increase in mandatory annuity and life ins
urance programs, as well as the rapid increase in the life expectancy
of older ages, motivates a better understanding of the incentive effec
ts that mortality-contingent claims have on longevity-related behavior
. We claim that these incentives often alter the standard conclusions
obtained about old-age support when mortality is treated exogenously.
In particular, we argue that annuities involve moral hazard effects th
at increase longevity and, among other things, introduce a positive in
teraction between public programs for health care and income support f
or the elderly-programs that have grown enormously in developed countr
ies.