CONCEPTUALIZING VOTER CHOICE FOR DIRECTIONAL AND DISCOUNTING MODELS OF 2-CANDIDATE SPATIAL COMPETITION IN TERMS OF SHADOW CANDIDATES

In contrast to the traditional modeling of voter choice based on proxi mity, under directional models, selection of candidates is based on th e direction and/or intensity of change from a status quo or neutral po int. Voter choice can also be modeled as representing both approaches, e.g., as a directional model with proximity restraint, or alternative ly, in terms of proximity to discounted positions. We provide a unifie d perspective for these seemingly disparate models in terms of what we call ''shadow'' positions. We demonstrate that voter choice in a vari ety of spatial models including directional components can be viewed a s proximity-based choices. Voters choose the candidate whose shadow is nearer, where shadow locations are defined by a simple transformation . We apply this approach to equilibrium analysis, showing that results for a discounted proximity model can be carried over - via shadows - to a variety of directional models.