THE DONATION BOOTH - MANDATING DONOR ANONYMITY TO DISRUPT THE MARKET FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE

In this article, Professors Ayres and Bulow argue that, instead of man dating disclosure of all campaign contributions we should instead cons ider mandating that all contributions be anonymous. Just as the secret ballot makes it more difficult for candidates to buy votes, mandating anonymous donations can make it more difficult for candidates to sell access or influence. Forcing donors to funnel campaign contributions through blind trusts can discourage quid pro quo corruption because ca ndidates never learn whether particular donors paid the price. To impl ement their proposal, the authors articulate a mimicry principle that would allow faux donors to send the same signals as real donors. Talk is cheap;just as anyone can say they voted for Clinton anyone-includin g faux donors-could claim they donated money. Mandating donor anyonymi ty is also more clearly consitutional than several alternative reforms . In a world in which the free speech burdens of the voting booth and mandated disclosure are constitutional (because of their impact on cor ruption), a properly structured ''donation booth'' is a fortiori const itutional. Mandated anonymity however, is not a panacea. This reform w ould predictably shift money toward less accountable ''issue advocacy' ' expenditures and may be so effective in disrupting the market for in fluence that it cripples candidates' ability to raise funds. Even cons idering these unintended effects, the article suggests that forms of m andated anonymity might usefully compliment other campaign finance res trictions.