THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

Campaign finance reform rests on a central fear: that political actors will convert economic advantage into political power. However, this f ear assumes a failure of normative democratic theory. If voters think through political decisions in the way democratic theory assumes-by ex ercising informed careful, independent judgment-economic inequalities among candidates should make little difference to the outcome of elect ions. Reform, then, is premised on doubt about voters'-or at least som e voters'-civic capabilities. This is the democratic paradox of campai gn finance reform. This article reveals this paradox and traces simila rities between campaign finance reform and other types of regulation o f the political process-some attractive and some not. It concludes tha t the paradox is unavoidable and, although discomforting, should be ma de transparent. For only by confronting our democratic shortcomings ca n we hope to overcome them.