Efficiency and rationality in organizations

Gibbons argues persuasively that economic modeling offers a useful set of t ools that noneconomists may employ to good effect in their research on orga nizations. His arguments are even more persuasive if it is understood that this brand of modeling lends itself naturally to one of the key theoretical problems facing such researchers-the need for a theory of aggregation, som etimes called a theory of action. Such a theory is necessary to link the be havior of individuals with properties of collectivities, such as corporatio ns. Gibbons demonstrates that organizations populated with utility-maximizi ng actors can nevertheless be characterized by political chicanery, foolish ness, and structural inertia, all of which can be seen as kinds of "organiz ational messes." So building a macro theory on rationalist assumptions does not require one to ignore many of the phenomena that have interested organ izations researchers in the past.*