This paper considers the problem facing a central government which can insu
re regional governments (by use of intergovernmental grants) against region
-specific and privately observed shocks either to income, or demand for, or
cost of, the public good. Notable results are: (i) depending on the source
of the shock, the grant may induce over- or undersupply of the public good
relative to the Samuelson rule; (ii) with public good spillovers between r
egions, there is two-way distortion of public good supply - that is, qualit
atively different distortions (relative to the Samuelson rule) for differen
t values of the shock; (iii) the solution to the central government's probl
em may depend qualitatively on whether regional taxation is lump-sum or dis
tortionary. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.