Kleptocracy and revolutions

This paper develops an economic theory of revolutions as manifestations of kleptocratic rivalry. The theory implies that whether or not a revolution o ccurs and, ii a revolution occurs, the probability that it will be successf ul depends only on the current realizations of the stochastic factors, such as the current potential revolutionary leader's skill in organizing a revo lution, that determine the expected effectiveness of insurgents relative to the ruler's soldiers. But, the theory also implies that, given the current realization of the expected effectiveness of insurgents, more is spent on deterring revolutions that do not occur, and revolutions when they occur co nsume more resources, the larger is the value of being the kleptocratic rul er. Usurprisingly, some of those who suffered for the cause, in exile or underg round, now feel they deserve their just rewards: good salaries, nice cars, patronage, and perks.