HAVING A CONCEPT SEE DOES NOT IMPLY ATTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE - SOME GENERAL-CONSIDERATIONS IN MEASURING THEORIES OF MIND

Authors
LEAVENS DA
Citation
Da. Leavens, HAVING A CONCEPT SEE DOES NOT IMPLY ATTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE - SOME GENERAL-CONSIDERATIONS IN MEASURING THEORIES OF MIND, Behavioral and brain sciences, 21(1), 1998, pp. 123
Citations number
6
Categorie Soggetti
Psychology, Biological",Neurosciences,"Behavioral Sciences
Journal title
Behavioral and brain sciences → ACNP
ISSN journal
0140525X
Volume
21
Issue
1
Year of publication
1998
Database
ISI
SICI code
0140-525X(1998)21:1<123:HACSDN>2.0.ZU;2-M
Abstract
That organisms have a concept ''see'' does not necessarily entail that they attribute knowledge to others or predict others' behaviors on th e basis of inferred mental states. An alternative experimental protoco l is proposed in which accurate prediction of the location of an exper imenters' impending appearance is contingent upon subjects' attributio n of knowledge to the experimenter.