LIBERALISM, CHAUVINISM, AND EXPERIMENTAL THOUGHT

The target article argued that there is currently no reliable evidence of theory of mind in nonhuman primates and proposed research methods for future use in this field. Some commentators judged the research pr oposals to be too chauvinist (in danger of falsely denying that primat es attribute mental states), but a majority judged them to be too libe ral (in danger of falsely affirming theory of mind in primates). The m ost valuable comments from both camps exemplified ''experimental thoug ht,'' the obverse of ''thought experiments,'' and recommended specific alterations and alternatives to the studies I proposed. This Response evaluates these recommendations and presents a revised version of the proposals that appear in the target article. Other valuable commentar y cast doubt on the assumption that people have a theory of mind, aire d the possibility that language may be a prerequisite for either posse ssion or detection of a theory of mind, questioned the notion of criti cal experiments, and emphasized the distinction between attribution of sight and belief. In addition to commenting on these issues, I respon d to objections to my interpretation of existing research on self-reco gnition, imitation, and deception.