Traditionally, models of categorization have been based on the premise
that, in categorization, stimuli are grouped together because they ap
pear similar to each other. In the social domain, where categorization
processes are thought to play an important role in the phenomenon of
stereotyping, such a similarity-based conception of category organizat
ion seems inadequate. Stereotypes, as categorical knowledge associated
with social groups, generally reflect the perceiver's subjective cons
trual of similarity relations in the social environment, instead of th
ese similarity relations being based on an a priori structure of attri
bute covariations. Moreover, people's knowledge about social categorie
s generally goes beyond assumptions regarding the presence or absence
of category attributes that presumably define similarity relations. In
many instances, social categorical knowledge includes important assum
ptions about how group attributes are related to one another; and the
grouping of the social environment therefore reflects the perceiver's
inferences and causal attributions based on this knowledge. Two experi
ments are reported to illustrate these arguments. The possibility of c
onceptualizing stereotypes as social knowledge organized by the percei
ver's naive theories is explored as an alternative to a purely similar
ity-based categorization model.