K. Hoff et Je. Stiglitz, MONEYLENDERS AND BANKERS - PRICE-INCREASING SUBSIDES IN A MONOPOLISTICALLY COMPETITIVE MARKET (VOL 52, PG 429, 1997), Journal of development economics, 55(2), 1998, pp. 483
In many areas of the world, a significant part of the cost of obtainin
g a good or service is the cost of enforcing the contracts entailed in
its provision. Pie present models of markets with endogenous enforcem
ent costs, motivated by studies of rural credit markets. We show that
subsidies may have perverse effects under monopolistic competition, in
creasing prices or inducing exit. Higher prices (interest rates) resul
t from the loss of scale economies or from negative externalities amon
g suppliers. The models are consistent with the puzzling evidence that
infusions of government-subsidized formal credit have not improved th
e terms offered by moneylenders. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.