THE REVEALED PREFERENCES OF STATE EPAS - STRINGENCY, ENFORCEMENT, ANDSUBSTITUTION

Authors
Citation
E. Helland, THE REVEALED PREFERENCES OF STATE EPAS - STRINGENCY, ENFORCEMENT, ANDSUBSTITUTION, Journal of environmental economics and management (Print), 35(3), 1998, pp. 242-261
Citations number
30
Categorie Soggetti
Economics,"Environmental Studies",Business
ISSN journal
00950696
Volume
35
Issue
3
Year of publication
1998
Pages
242 - 261
Database
ISI
SICI code
0095-0696(1998)35:3<242:TRPOSE>2.0.ZU;2-1
Abstract
The EPA suggests states inspect polluters at least once a year and use sampling and nonsampling inspections equally. States face two separat e pressures in their attempts to comply with these mandates: political and budgetary. Budgetary considerations arise because inspections are costly while political pressures arise because the stringency of enfo rcement, in part, determines the cost abatement. This study estimates the relative importance of political and budgetary pressures in the st ringency with which the Clean Water Act is enforced. The results sugge st that inspections determined by budgetary concerns and the stringenc y of inspections is determined, in part, by political factors. (C) 199 8 Academic Press.