Skinner's views are commonly misrepresented. One reason for this diffi
culty is that changes in the way that Skinner formulated his views occ
urred in a gradual evolution over time throughout Skinner's career, an
d the changes and their significance were not as conspicuously marked
as they might have been. Among these changes were a movement from a tw
o-term necessity to a three-term contingency; a movement from discrimi
native stimulus to setting as the first term in his three-term conting
ency; and a movement from determinism to random variation as a foundat
ional principle in his selectionist behaviorism. When not seen in thei
r historical development over time, a sample reading of Skinner's view
s may readily result in misleading or inaccurate interpretations, part
icularly in respect to his later work. Seen in historical context, how
ever, the accounts that survived after the changes Skinner made are we
ll integrated in a selectionist theory of behavior.