In this Article, Professor Michael Selmi contends that one important r
eason civil rights legislation has produced less change than originall
y expected is that most of the legislation entrusted principal enforce
ment to the federal government, and that enforcement has been seriousl
y deficient over time. Through a detailed empirical analysis, this Art
icle compares the efforts of public and private attorneys in enforcing
fair housing and employment discrimination laws, and demonstrates tha
t the government generally brings far fewer cases and receives substan
tially less relief than private attorneys. In both housing and employm
ent, the government has concentrated its efforts on individual cases,
focusing primarily on family status housing cases and age discriminati
on employment cases. The discrepancies between the two enforcement gro
ups arise, Professor Selmi argues, from bureaucratic pressures that pr
od government attorneys to bring easy and noncontroversial cases as a
means of avoiding the conflict chat so readily accompanies civil right
s enforcement.