REACTIONS AND RECIPROCITY - TARIFFS AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION FROM 1815 TO 1914

If one country lowers its tariffs, other countries might follow suit b y liberalizing or defend their market by raising tariffs or do nothing at all. The question of a state's reaction to the tariff policy of an other has been undertheorized, although it plays an important, implici t role in debates between theories. To understand these reactions, the author proposes a model of trade policy and tariff reciprocity that e ncompasses variables from both the domestic and international levels o f analysis in a way that is compatible with several different theories . Two major testable propositions follow from the analysis. First, two countries' tariffs will move in opposite directions without trade agr eements. Second, two countries' tariffs will move in the same directio n when they have signed a trade agreement. These hypotheses find subst antial support in both quantitative and qualitative tests against the period from 1815 to 1914, when there was substantial variation in coun tries' willingness to sign reciprocal tariff agreements.