State-society differentiation and political centralization interact to
influence the amount, focus, and effect of legal activity. Using case
studies of antinuclear power litigation in the 1970s in the United St
ates, West Germany, France, and Sweden, this article develops a genera
l theory of political systems and legal activity. While the United Sta
tes, West Germany, and France all had considerable amounts of antinucl
ear litigation, in France and Germany such litigation was directed alm
ost exclusively at the state. In the United States, the targets of ant
inuclear litigation were much more diffuse. Centralized Sweden with it
s corporatist political system had significantly less antinuclear lega
l activity than the other three countries, which were roughly comparab
le. Germany was the only country in which the state took an active rol
e in shaping the content of legal cases, and it was the only country w
here litigation became a critical factor in modifying national policy.
Through these case studies, this article explores how contextual fact
ors such as the political frames of nation-states, which exist apart f
rom individual litigiousness and even apart from legal systems themsel
ves may create particular cross-cultural variations in patterns of leg
al activity.