REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY VERSUS CORPORATE DEMOCRACY - HOW SOFT MONEY ERODES THE PRINCIPLE OF ONE-PERSON, ONE VOTE

Authors
Citation
Rd. Feingold, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY VERSUS CORPORATE DEMOCRACY - HOW SOFT MONEY ERODES THE PRINCIPLE OF ONE-PERSON, ONE VOTE, Harvard journal on legislation, 35(2), 1998, pp. 377-386
Citations number
21
Categorie Soggetti
Law
ISSN journal
0017808X
Volume
35
Issue
2
Year of publication
1998
Pages
377 - 386
Database
ISI
SICI code
0017-808X(1998)35:2<377:RDVCD->2.0.ZU;2-7
Abstract
The costs of political campaigns have spiraled in the past decade. Ind ividuals and groups have seized on this ever-increasing need to spend money by purchasing access to politicians and influence over policymak ing. In this Essay, Senator Feingold explains how the explosion of ''s oft money,'' unlimited contributions to political parties from corpora tions, labor unions, and wealthy individuals, has tilted the electoral playing field away from ordinary Americans. A ''representative democr acy'' is thus being displaced by what the author calls a ''corporate d emocracy,'' in which a person or group's influence over the political process is in proportion to the amount of money they put into the proc ess. The author concludes by describing how legislation he has propose d, the McCain-Feingold bill, would ban soft money and still be constit utional under the Supreme Court's Buckley v. Valeo decision.