PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO PETITION - WHY A LOBBYING CONTINGENCY FEE PROHIBITION VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION

Citation
Sl. Fatka et Jm. Levien, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO PETITION - WHY A LOBBYING CONTINGENCY FEE PROHIBITION VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION, Harvard journal on legislation, 35(2), 1998, pp. 559-587
Citations number
50
Categorie Soggetti
Law
ISSN journal
0017808X
Volume
35
Issue
2
Year of publication
1998
Pages
559 - 587
Database
ISI
SICI code
0017-808X(1998)35:2<559:PTRTP->2.0.ZU;2-F
Abstract
Every year the number of lobbyists and the amount spent on lobbying in creases rapidly Proposals to curtail lobbying by banning contingency f ee lobbying arrangements are introduced in each session of Congress an d have been passed in many states. The authors of this Note argue that such bans often preclude individuals and organizations with few finan cial resources from lobbying. They contend further that lobbying has b ecome the most effective means of exercising the First Amendment right to petition. The authors note that regulating lobbying serves a compe lling state interest in inhibiting political corruption, but conclude that a ban on all contingency fee lobbying contracts would be overbroa d and would place an unconstitutional burden on the right to petition.