Sl. Fatka et Jm. Levien, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO PETITION - WHY A LOBBYING CONTINGENCY FEE PROHIBITION VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION, Harvard journal on legislation, 35(2), 1998, pp. 559-587
Every year the number of lobbyists and the amount spent on lobbying in
creases rapidly Proposals to curtail lobbying by banning contingency f
ee lobbying arrangements are introduced in each session of Congress an
d have been passed in many states. The authors of this Note argue that
such bans often preclude individuals and organizations with few finan
cial resources from lobbying. They contend further that lobbying has b
ecome the most effective means of exercising the First Amendment right
to petition. The authors note that regulating lobbying serves a compe
lling state interest in inhibiting political corruption, but conclude
that a ban on all contingency fee lobbying contracts would be overbroa
d and would place an unconstitutional burden on the right to petition.