P. Mosley et D. Hulme, MICROENTERPRISE FINANCE - IS THERE A CONFLICT BETWEEN GROWTH AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION, World development, 26(5), 1998, pp. 783-790
Microenterprise finance has generated enormous enthusiasm among aid do
nors and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) as an instrument for reduc
ing poverty in a manner that is financially self-sustaining. Although
something of a consensus has emerged concerning the principles by whic
h such institutions should be designed, however, we know little about
their impact. The paper reports on a research project which estimated
the impact of 13 microfinance institutions in seven developing countri
es on poverty and other target variables, and attempted to relate such
impact to the institutions' design features. For each of the institut
ions studied, the impact of lending on the recipient household's incom
e tended to increase, at a decreasing rate, as the recipient's income
and asset position improved, a relationship which can easily be explai
ned in terms of the greater preference of the poor for consumption loa
ns, their greater vulnerability to asset sales forced by adverse incom
e shocks and their limited range of investment opportunities. There ar
e significant outliers to this general pattern (in particular, very po
or people who have been able to achieve significant loan impact); but
they are the exception rather than the rule, and the relationship is s
ignificant at the 1% level for all the institutions studied except the
Malawi Mudzi Fund. This relationship defines, in the short term, an '
'impact frontier'' which serves as a tradeoff: lenders can either focu
s their lending an the poorest and accept a relatively low total impac
t on household income, or alternatively focus on the not-so-poor and a
chieve higher impact. The position and slope of the estimated impact c
urve vary however with the design of the institution: for ''well-desig
ned'' schemes impact, at all levels of income, is higher than for ill-
designed schemes. Hence for many lender institutions the tradeoff can
often be moved by appropriate innovations in institutional design, in
particular modifications to savings, loan collection, and incentive ar
rangements for borrowers and staff. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. Al
rights reserved.