AGENCY COSTS, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Authors
Citation
He. Leland, AGENCY COSTS, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE, The Journal of finance (New York), 53(4), 1998, pp. 1213-1243
Citations number
56
Categorie Soggetti
Business Finance
ISSN journal
00221082
Volume
53
Issue
4
Year of publication
1998
Pages
1213 - 1243
Database
ISI
SICI code
0022-1082(1998)53:4<1213:ACRMAC>2.0.ZU;2-U
Abstract
The joint determination of capital structure and investment risk is ex amined. Optimal capital structure reflects both the tax advantages of debt less default costs (Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963)), and the agency costs resulting from asset substitution (Jensen and Meekling (1 976)). Agency costs restrict leverage and debt maturity and increase y ield spreads, but their importance is small for the range of environme nts considered. Risk management is also examined. Hedging permits grea ter leverage. Even when a firm cannot precommit to hedging, it will st ill do so. Surprisingly, hedging benefits often are greater when agenc y costs are low.