THE EFFECT OF LIFTING THE BLINDFOLD FROM CIVIL JURIES CHARGED WITH APPORTIONING DAMAGES IN MODIFIED COMPARATIVE FAULT CASES - AN EMPIRICAL-STUDY OF THE ALTERNATIVES

In modified comparative fault actions, a ''blindfold'' rule prohibits disclosing to the jury the existence of a percentage bar to the plaint iffs recovery; a ''sunshine'' rule permits or requires this disclosure . The rise, fall, and the 1995 reemergence of the blindfold rule as a ''tort reform'' measure is chronicled and analyzed. An empirical labor atory experiment was performed to compare the economic effects of ''bl indfold'' and ''sunshine'' rules. Verdict results from samples of 39 b lindfold and 43 sunshine mock juries composed of undergraduate student -subjects were compared. The data indicate that, under the sunshine ru le, the percentages of fault attributable to plaintiffs will be less. Plaintiffs may prevail more often, but the amount of damages awarded b y sunshine juries also appears to be less, yielding a statistically in significant, aggregate economic effect. The data suggest, therefore, t hat blindfolding on the percentage of negligence is likely to be ineff ective tort reform.