PRIVATIZATION AND EFFICIENCY WAGES

Authors
Citation
L. Goerke, PRIVATIZATION AND EFFICIENCY WAGES, Journal of economics (Wien), 67(3), 1998, pp. 243-264
Citations number
30
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
ISSN journal
09318658
Volume
67
Issue
3
Year of publication
1998
Pages
243 - 264
Database
ISI
SICI code
0931-8658(1998)67:3<243:PAEW>2.0.ZU;2-4
Abstract
The impact of privatization is investigated in a shirking model of eff iciency wages. Without trade unions, privatization - modeled as a stri cter control of employees - lowers wages and raises employment, output , and profits, while effort and productivity effects depend on the emp loyees' risk aversion. However, for a utilitarian monopoly union, faci ng a company characterized by a constant-elasticity labor-demand sched ule, privatization raises efficiency wages. If privatization is modele d as a stronger profit orientation, wages, effort, and labor productiv ity will rise, while employment will shrink in a wage-setting firm. Ag ain, wage and employment effects can be reversed in the case of wage n egotiations.