THE 3RD LEG OF THE KANTIAN TRIPOD FOR PEACE - INTERNATIONAL-ORGANIZATIONS AND MILITARIZED DISPUTES, 1950-85

Immanuel Kant believed that democracy, economic interdependence, and i nternational law and organizations could establish the foundations for ''perpetual peace. '' Our analyses of politically relevant dyads show that each of the three elements of the Kantian peace makes a statisti cally significant, independent contribution to peaceful interstate rel ations. These benefits are evident even when the influence of other th eoretically interesting factors-such as relative power, alliances, geo graphic contiguity, and economic growth-is held constant. Increasing t he number of shared memberships in intergovernmental organizations (IG Os) by one standard deviation reduces the incidence of militarized dis putes by about 23 percent from the baseline rate for a typical pair of bordering states. If both members of a dyad are democratic, conflict is 35 percent less likely than the baseline; increasing both the dyadi c trade-GDP ratio and the trend in trade by a standard deviation reduc es the chance of conflict by 38 percent. Together, all the Kantian var iables lower the probability of a dispute by 72 percent. We check for reverse causation and find reason to believe that a feedback system is at work, with IGOs reducing conflict and low-conflict dyads joining I GOs. Democracies and interdependent states are more likely to join IGO s with one another, bringing together the three elements of a system.