LET THE CHITS FALL WHERE THEY MAY - EXECUTIVE AND CONSTITUENCY INFLUENCES ON CONGRESSIONAL VOTING ON NAFTA

The approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by the House of Representatives in November 1993 depended heavily on lobbyin g by President Clinton. I show that this lobbying power does not inher e in the presidency, but was strategic. Clinton concentrated his lobby ing on members who were either undecided or leaning against NAFTA in S eptember, as well as members who received large contributions from bus iness and from districts where the president did well. I use estimates of lobbying efforts derived from probit analysis to predict the NAFTA vote. This endogenous measure of contacting had the third greatest ef fect for Democratic House members voting on NAFTA (behind only preside ntial support) and labor political action committee contributions. But for Republicans, contact seemed to have a perverse negative effect.