SELF OR NO-SELF - CONVERGING PERSPECTIVES FROM NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND MYSTICISM

Authors
Citation
Bl. Lancaster, SELF OR NO-SELF - CONVERGING PERSPECTIVES FROM NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND MYSTICISM, Zygon, 28(4), 1993, pp. 507-526
Citations number
54
Categorie Soggetti
Social Issues",Religion
Journal title
ZygonACNP
ISSN journal
05912385
Volume
28
Issue
4
Year of publication
1993
Pages
507 - 526
Database
ISI
SICI code
0591-2385(1993)28:4<507:SON-CP>2.0.ZU;2-D
Abstract
The nature of self is examined in relation to psychological observatio ns which reveal som, form of dissociation of knowledge from consciousn ess. Such dissociations are apparent in cases of blindsight, and amnes ic patients displaying implicit memory effects, among others. While am nesic patients, for example, are unable consciously to recall material previously presented, such material does influence subsequent physiol ogical and psychological processes. Thus, it is not the memories thems elves that have been lost, but the ability to make conscious connectio n to them. In attempting to account for such observations, theoreticia ns generally have posited some kind of ''consciousness system'' that m ay become dissociated from brain modules dealing with specific process ing. It is argued here that a view of self along the lines of the Budd hist concepts of no-self and the conditioned nature of ''I'' introduce s a more parsimonious perspective on the neuropsychological data. A th eory of the nature of self is presented that constitutes a synthesis b etween key ideas drawn from Buddhist and other mainly mystical traditi ons and the scientific observations in psychology. Central to this the ory is the role that the left hemisphere's interpreter (Gazzaniga 1985 ; 1988a; 1988b) plays in constructing a unified ''I.'' This ''I'' is, in effect, a hypothesis that the mind generates to introduce some cohe rence into otherwise fragmentary mental elements. Although it appears to be the causal focus of the individual's behavior and experience, it is in fact a retrospective construction and not a true causal structu re of the mind. This theoretical view is discussed in relation to vari ous meanings of the term consciousness and also in relation to the rel evant neuropsychological cases.