The nature of self is examined in relation to psychological observatio
ns which reveal som, form of dissociation of knowledge from consciousn
ess. Such dissociations are apparent in cases of blindsight, and amnes
ic patients displaying implicit memory effects, among others. While am
nesic patients, for example, are unable consciously to recall material
previously presented, such material does influence subsequent physiol
ogical and psychological processes. Thus, it is not the memories thems
elves that have been lost, but the ability to make conscious connectio
n to them. In attempting to account for such observations, theoreticia
ns generally have posited some kind of ''consciousness system'' that m
ay become dissociated from brain modules dealing with specific process
ing. It is argued here that a view of self along the lines of the Budd
hist concepts of no-self and the conditioned nature of ''I'' introduce
s a more parsimonious perspective on the neuropsychological data. A th
eory of the nature of self is presented that constitutes a synthesis b
etween key ideas drawn from Buddhist and other mainly mystical traditi
ons and the scientific observations in psychology. Central to this the
ory is the role that the left hemisphere's interpreter (Gazzaniga 1985
; 1988a; 1988b) plays in constructing a unified ''I.'' This ''I'' is,
in effect, a hypothesis that the mind generates to introduce some cohe
rence into otherwise fragmentary mental elements. Although it appears
to be the causal focus of the individual's behavior and experience, it
is in fact a retrospective construction and not a true causal structu
re of the mind. This theoretical view is discussed in relation to vari
ous meanings of the term consciousness and also in relation to the rel
evant neuropsychological cases.