It has long been recognized in economics that individuals can derive b
enefits from a resource stock without directly or indirectly utilizing
that resource. Such non-use values, including existence values and be
quest values, are often ignored in models of resource management. In t
his paper, a simple, two-country model of the management of a renewabl
e resource is developed in which at least one country has a non-econom
ic interest in the conservation of the fish stock to examine the impac
t of such a non-use value on the end-of-period harvest and self-enforc
ing sharing rule. The model shows that this non-lucrative pursuit serv
es to decrease the total allowable catch for each period at the expens
e of the catch share of the more conservation-oriented country, a resu
lt that is consistent with the September 1995 decision by NAFO ending
the dispute between Canada and the EU over turbot. (C) 1998 Elsevier S
cience B.V. All rights reserved.