PUBLIC-OPINION AS A DOMESTIC CONSTRAINT IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS- 2-LEVEL GAMES IN THE ANGLO-IRISH PEACE PROCESS

This article aims to broaden the theoretical foundations of the two-le vel games approach to understanding international negotiations by cons idering the conditions under which public opinion can act as a domesti c constraint on the ability of international negotiators to reach agre ement. In determining the role that public opinion plays, three factor s are of central importance: (I) the preferences of the public relativ e to those of decision makers and other domestic constituents; (2) the intensity of the issue under negotiation; and (3) the power of the pu blic to ratify a potential agreement. Evidence from the last decade of Anglo-lrish negotiations over the future and status of Northern Irela nd shows that public opinion acts as a constraint on negotiators when the public has the power to directly ratify an international agreement . When the public's power to ratify an agreement is indirect, the inte nsity of the issue under negotiation will play a critical role in dete rmining whether public preferences serve as a constraint on decision m akers.