THE POLITICS OF THREAT PERCEPTION AND THE USE OF FORCE - A POLITICAL-ECONOMY MODEL OF US USES OF FORCE, 1949-1994

A growing body of empirical research addresses the influence of domest ic political and economic circumstances on the use of force. Most mode ls explain the use of force as a function of various domestic and inte rnational demands for military force. This article uses data on U.S. u ses of force between 1949 and 1994 to test a model that also considers the influence of these conditions on the supply of this policy instru ment. Conditions that have complementary demand and supply effects-mak ing military force both more useful and less costly to employ-are asso ciated with frequent U.S. uses of force in the postwar era. These cond itions include high unemployment, strong investor confidence, wartime presidential election years, and the absence of ongoing wars. Some of these same conditions contribute to a motivated bias in international threat perception, leading U.S. decision makers to perceive more oppor tunities for the use of force when it is most convenient for them to e mploy it.