RAMSEYS FOUNDATIONS EXTENDED TO DESIRABILITIES

In his Truth and Probability (1926), Frank Ramsey provides foundations for measures of degrees of belief in propositions and preferences for worlds. Nonquantitative conditions on preferences for worlds, and gam bles for worlds and certain near-worlds, are formulated which he says insure that a subject's preferences for worlds are represented by numb ers, world values. Numbers, for his degrees of belief in propositions, probabilities, are then defined in terms of his world values. Ramsey does not also propose definitions of desirabilities for propositions, though he is in a position to do this. Given his measures for probabil ities of propositions and values of worlds, he can frame natural defin itions for both evidential and causal desirabilities that would measur e respectively the welcomeness of propositions as items of news, and a s facts. His theory is neutral with respect to the evidential/causal d ivision. In the present paper, as Ramsey's foundations are explained, several problems and limitations are noted. Their distinctive virtue - their evidential/causal neutrality - is demonstrated. Comparisons are made with other foundational schemes, and a perspective is recommende d from which nonquantitative foundations are not the be all for quanti tative theories of ideal preferences and credences.