A variety of ideas arising in decoherence theory, and in the ongoing d
ebate over Everett's relative-state theory, can be linked to issues in
relativity theory and the philosophy of time, specifically the relati
onal theory of tense and of identity over time. These have been system
atically presented in companion papers (Saunders 1995; 1996a); in what
follows we shall consider the same circle of ideas, but specifically
in relation to the interpretation of probability, and its identificati
on with relations in the Hilbert Space norm. The familiar objection th
at Everett's approach yields probabilities different from quantum mech
anics is easily dealt with. The more fundamental question is how to in
terpret these probabilities consistent with the relational theory of c
hange, and the relational theory of identity over time. I shall show t
hat the relational theory needs nothing more than the physical, minima
l criterion of identity as defined by Everett's theory, and that this
can be transparently interpreted in terms of the ordinary notion of th
e chance occurrence of an event, as witnessed in the present. It is in
this sense that the theory has empirical content.