BICAMERAL SEQUENCE - THEORY AND STATE LEGISLATIVE EVIDENCE

Authors
Citation
Jr. Rogers, BICAMERAL SEQUENCE - THEORY AND STATE LEGISLATIVE EVIDENCE, American journal of political science, 42(4), 1998, pp. 1025-1060
Citations number
44
Categorie Soggetti
Political Science
ISSN journal
00925853
Volume
42
Issue
4
Year of publication
1998
Pages
1025 - 1060
Database
ISI
SICI code
0092-5853(1998)42:4<1025:BS-TAS>2.0.ZU;2-3
Abstract
Theory: Voting sequence is a strategic variable between bicameral cham bers. Decisions by chambers to acquire costly information affect the p ayoffs chambers receive from sequencing choices. Thus, it is also a st rategic variable between bicameral chambers. Hypotheses: (1) Because o f incentives to take advantage of one chamber's informational expertis e when chambers share relatively homogeneous policy preferences, house chambers in legislatures dominated by a single party will initiate ad opted legislation in greater proportion relative to legislatures that are not dominated by a single party. (2) A cost advantage in acquiring information grows with an increasing disparity in the number of legis lators between bicameral chambers. Lower information acquisition costs in the larger bicameral chamber account for a persistent first-mover advantage for that chamber. Methods: Hypotheses are derived from a gam e theoretic model in which informational endowments are endogenously c hosen by bicameral chambers and in which voting sequence is endogenous ly determined. Implications of the model are tested with an original d ata set developed from the session laws of thirty-three state legislat ures. Results: Under specified conditions, bicameral chambers sequence themselves to take advantage of one chamber's informational expertise . Under other conditions, bicameral chambers will not take advantage o f a chamber's informational expertise. The main theoretical results co nclude: (1) that one-party legislatures take greater advantage of info rmational expertise relative to divided-party legislatures; (2) that s enators have an incentive to specialize in more risky policy environme nts relative to house members; and, (3) that there is an informational basis for house chambers to initiate more adopted legislation than se nate chambers. The empirical results are consistent with hypothesis 1. The results are consistent with hypothesis 2, although an alternative (noncontradictory) theory might also account for the result.