Theory: Voting sequence is a strategic variable between bicameral cham
bers. Decisions by chambers to acquire costly information affect the p
ayoffs chambers receive from sequencing choices. Thus, it is also a st
rategic variable between bicameral chambers. Hypotheses: (1) Because o
f incentives to take advantage of one chamber's informational expertis
e when chambers share relatively homogeneous policy preferences, house
chambers in legislatures dominated by a single party will initiate ad
opted legislation in greater proportion relative to legislatures that
are not dominated by a single party. (2) A cost advantage in acquiring
information grows with an increasing disparity in the number of legis
lators between bicameral chambers. Lower information acquisition costs
in the larger bicameral chamber account for a persistent first-mover
advantage for that chamber. Methods: Hypotheses are derived from a gam
e theoretic model in which informational endowments are endogenously c
hosen by bicameral chambers and in which voting sequence is endogenous
ly determined. Implications of the model are tested with an original d
ata set developed from the session laws of thirty-three state legislat
ures. Results: Under specified conditions, bicameral chambers sequence
themselves to take advantage of one chamber's informational expertise
. Under other conditions, bicameral chambers will not take advantage o
f a chamber's informational expertise. The main theoretical results co
nclude: (1) that one-party legislatures take greater advantage of info
rmational expertise relative to divided-party legislatures; (2) that s
enators have an incentive to specialize in more risky policy environme
nts relative to house members; and, (3) that there is an informational
basis for house chambers to initiate more adopted legislation than se
nate chambers. The empirical results are consistent with hypothesis 1.
The results are consistent with hypothesis 2, although an alternative
(noncontradictory) theory might also account for the result.