WITH GOOD CAUSE - BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION AND THE POLITICS OF CHILD-SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT

Authors
Citation
Lr. Keiser et J. Soss, WITH GOOD CAUSE - BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION AND THE POLITICS OF CHILD-SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, American journal of political science, 42(4), 1998, pp. 1133-1156
Citations number
80
Categorie Soggetti
Political Science
ISSN journal
00925853
Volume
42
Issue
4
Year of publication
1998
Pages
1133 - 1156
Database
ISI
SICI code
0092-5853(1998)42:4<1133:WGC-BD>2.0.ZU;2-Q
Abstract
Theory: Open systems theories of administration suggest that implement ation of a federal policy should reflect the systematic effects of sta te-level conditions on bureaucratic discretion. Hypotheses: Usage of t he good cause exemption in the child support enforcement program will vary systematically across states depending on the internal and enviro nmental characteristics of stare bureaucracies. Methods: A pooled time -series model is used to analyze patterns of exemption in the fifty st ates for 1990 through 1992. Results: Discretionary use of the good cau se exemption is systematically affected by partisan control of state g overnments, the values of state administrators, the funding decisions of elected officials, and the levels of demand placed on the bureaucra cy.