Lr. Keiser et J. Soss, WITH GOOD CAUSE - BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION AND THE POLITICS OF CHILD-SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, American journal of political science, 42(4), 1998, pp. 1133-1156
Theory: Open systems theories of administration suggest that implement
ation of a federal policy should reflect the systematic effects of sta
te-level conditions on bureaucratic discretion. Hypotheses: Usage of t
he good cause exemption in the child support enforcement program will
vary systematically across states depending on the internal and enviro
nmental characteristics of stare bureaucracies. Methods: A pooled time
-series model is used to analyze patterns of exemption in the fifty st
ates for 1990 through 1992. Results: Discretionary use of the good cau
se exemption is systematically affected by partisan control of state g
overnments, the values of state administrators, the funding decisions
of elected officials, and the levels of demand placed on the bureaucra
cy.