PRISONERS-DILEMMA PAYOFF STRUCTURE IN INTERFIRM STRATEGIC ALLIANCES -AN EMPIRICAL-TEST

Citation
A. Parkhe et al., PRISONERS-DILEMMA PAYOFF STRUCTURE IN INTERFIRM STRATEGIC ALLIANCES -AN EMPIRICAL-TEST, Omega, 21(5), 1993, pp. 531-539
Citations number
30
Categorie Soggetti
Management,"Operatione Research & Management Science
Journal title
OmegaACNP
ISSN journal
03050483
Volume
21
Issue
5
Year of publication
1993
Pages
531 - 539
Database
ISI
SICI code
0305-0483(1993)21:5<531:PPSIIS>2.0.ZU;2-N
Abstract
Interfirm strategic alliances (ISAs) are proliferating rapidly. The mi xed motive-competitive and cooperative-nature of ISAs is hypotheticall y captured by the prisoner's dilemma (PD) model. Until now, empirical research in realistic business settings into the payoff structure obta ined in ISAs has been lacking. After examining the incentives inherent in the PD payoff structure, this study presents the results of a US n ationwide mail survey of 342 senior executives recently involved in IS As. The results corroborate the existence of a payoff structure which satisfies the PD payoff structure. Some implications for promoting coo perative behavior as well as future research directions are discussed.