THE DYNAMICS OF SENATORIAL REPRESENTATION, 1952-1991

We propose a dynamic model of representation that posits that represen tatives adapt through time to minimize the distance between policy cho ices and constituent, global, and personal preferences. Several hypoth eses flow from the dynamic model: (1) equilibria develop through time in senator policy choice; (2) representatives adapt through time to gl obal, as well as constituent preferences; (3) the manner in which adap tation occurs depends on the strength of the representative's personal ideology; (4) the manner in which adaptation occurs depends on variou s measures of constituency efficiency. We use pooled time-series cross -section analysis of covariance techniques to evaluate the preceding h ypotheses. The analysis shows that senators integrate constituent, glo bal, and personal preferences. Equilibria exist through time in Senato r Policy Liberalism. Adaptation to and from the equilibria depends on global and constituent preferences and efficiency. The manner of adapt ation also depends on the strength of the representative's ideology an d the efficiency of the constituency.