Mercosur appears as an interesting case study for analyzing the determ
inants exceptions in regional trade agreements. Its member countries-A
rgentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay-intended to make Mercosur a fu
ll customs union by January 1995. This goal turned out to be too ambit
ious, and the Protocol of Ouro Preto and other agreements signed in De
cember 1994 led to a hybrid solution. Overall, out of a total of 9,119
tariff lines, around 30 percent are subject, in at least one member c
ountry, to either external deviations from the common external tariff
or internal deviations from free trade. Thus an important set of holes
remains under the existing agreement, leading some authors to conside
r Mercosur an incomplete customs union. This article compares the resu
lts of the theoretical literature on endogenous tariff formation with
evidence from Mercosur. The results show that Mercosur's common extern
al tariff and member countries' deviations from it and from internal f
ree trade can be explained by sector or industry lobbying as predicted
by the endogenous tariff literature. If a viable political economy is
a key to success, then Mercosur is here to stay.