SYMBOLS, SIGNALS, AND SOCIAL NORMS IN POLITICS AND THE LAW

This article uses a signaling model to explain the role of symbols in people's behavior and beliefs, with special attention to legal manipul ation of symbols. It is argued that certain actions become symbolic be cause they have the proper cost structure and because they are, for hi storical or psychological reasons, focal. The government can in theory use standard legal instruments (which mainly affect the cost of the s ignal) to change equilibrium behavior and belief. The use of the law i n this way is likely to have unpredictable effects because of multiple equilibria and of the sensitivity of behavior to parameters, but it o ccurs frequently because lobbying and other actions that influence law making can become signals themselves, and the law is simply an equilib rium outcome. The analysis is used to discuss flag desecration, censor ship, voting, and antidiscrimination laws.