Exemplar, prototype, and connectionist models typically assume that ev
ents constitute the basic unit of learning and representation in categ
orization. In these models, each learning event updates a statistical
representation of a category independently of other learning events. A
n implication is that events involving the same individual affect lear
ning independently and are not integrated into a single structure that
represents the individual in an internal model of the world. A series
of experiments demonstrates that human subjects track individuals acr
oss events, establish representations of them, and use these represent
ations in categorization. These findings are consistent with ''represe
ntationalism,'' the view that an internal model of the world constitut
es a physical level of representation in the brain, and that the brain
does not simply capture the statistical properties of events in an un
differentiated dynamical system.-Although categorization is an inheren
tly statistical process that produces generalization, pattern completi
on, frequency effects, and adaptive learning, it is also an inherently
representational process that establishes an internal model of the wo
rld. As a result, representational structures evolve in memory to trac
k the histories of individuals, accumulate information about them, and
simulate them in events, (C) 1998 Academic Press.