WITTGENSTEIN PROBLEM AND THE METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY - HOW GRAMMAR DEPENDS ON FACTS

The philosophy of Wittgenstein is often used to attack scientific appr oaches to psychological subject matter. Maraun (1998) furthers the ant i-psychological interpretation of Wittgenstein by criticizing contempo rary assumptions about reliability, validity and the measurement of ps ychological concepts in general. On one reading, Maraun's argument amo unts to the modest claim that scientific measurement is (in part) a ma tter of following prescriptive rules and norms. A more substantial but seriously problematic version of the argument is that measurement cla ims are entirely independent of empirical evidence. Drawing on textual analysis and scientific examples, we demonstrate that conceptual and empirical issues are interdependent in a variety of ways and that this interdependence is consistent with Wittgenstein's observation that 'g rammar depends on facts'. By clarifying the significance of Wittgenste inian philosophy of psychology, it is hoped that conceptual confusions concerning measurement techniques may be cleared away so that meaning ful empirical investigations may flourish.